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THE 2012 HONORABLE
JAMES R. BROWNING
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
TODAY’S SUPREME COURT
General William K. Suter*
Editors’ Note: The Montana Law Review was honored to have General
William K. Suter deliver the 2012 Honorable James R. Browning Distin-
guished Lecture in Law on April 12, 2012.  Each year since 2002, the
Browning Lecture has brought distinguished lawyers, scholars, and judges
from across the country to the University of Montana School of Law.  As
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, General Suter’s lecture
furthered that tradition.  As its namesake indicates, the Browning Lecture
honors the Honorable James R. Browning, formerly of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Judge Browning, who passed away
in May, 2012, was a member of the first editorial board of the Montana
Law Review and ultimately served as Editor-in-Chief.  He served with dis-
tinction for over 50 years on the Ninth Circuit, many of which he spent as
its Chief Judge.
Montana is no stranger to the Supreme Court.  You might recall that
last term the Court decided a case—I think you’ve heard of it—I think it
* General Willam Suter has been the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States since 1991.
He is the nineteenth person to hold that position.  Previously he was a career Army Judge Advocate and
retired as a Major General.  He served in numerous positions of responsibility around the world, includ-
ing Appellate Judge, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate of the U.S. Army Vietnam, Staff Judge Advocate of
the 101st Airborne Division, Commandant of the JAG School, and the Assistant  Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army.  His military awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal,
and the Parachutist Badge.  The opinions represented here do not necessarily represent those of the
Supreme Court or individual Justices.
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applies to that river we crossed a little while ago—PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana.1  It dealt with something I have never heard of, but you have:
navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine.  Not something I
would get up and say every morning before breakfast.  A most interesting
case.  I am sad to report that my Court reversed your Court, but it has been
remanded and the case is still alive.  I am not going to say anymore about
what we did on that case.  I have to get out of town alive.
Twenty-one years at the Supreme Court.  I have watched over 1,500
oral arguments.  The arguments are really great lawyering and also great
theater.  I will say this: The lawyers, your colleagues that argue up there,
including the Montana lawyers that have been there—in fact, your attorney
general has been up there—are very well argued.  I have discovered that it
is very simple.  Successful appellate advocacy depends on three things:
preparation, preparation, and preparation.  You can write that down.  I mean
it.  They get up there and they can answer any question.  I have a view from
the side where I can watch the court and I can watch—I sit next to Justice
Sotomayor to the side a little bit and I can watch the attorney.  When attor-
neys get asked difficult questions that he or she cannot answer, they lean
back.  When they know the answer, they lean forward.  They cannot wait
for that question to end because they have prepared for it and they have the
answer.  Some are so good—your colleagues up there are so good, they
argue cases with no notes—not even one 3x5 card, nothing.  Third years, I
don’t recommend doing that.  Take a few notes with you.  One of those
advocates, former Solicitor General Paul Clement, he is now just 45 years
old.  He was only 39 when he was the Solicitor General, a former law clerk
at the Court to Justice Scalia in, I believe, 1995 or 1996.  He has argued 60
cases at the Court, and he is arguing seven cases this term.  He argued three
of the Affordable Care Act cases,2 and he stands up there with not one note
and can answer any question, from anybody, anytime, including what page
something is on in one of the many briefs.  He is a very fine lawyer and he
is one to emulate if you are a young lawyer.
Sometimes some very humorous things happen.  One time there was
counsel arguing a case and Justice Stevens asked him a very difficult ques-
tion.  You could see that this poor fellow was struggling with the answer.
Justice Stevens wasn’t smiling or anything, but I could tell that he was not
displeased with the poor answer being given by the counsel.  When the poor
fellow ended, within nanoseconds, Justice Scalia said, “Let’s go back to
that question Justice Stevens asked.  Could you have answered it this way?”
Justice Scalia gave a drop-dead eloquent answer.  The poor fellow looked
1. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
2. See Natl. Fedn. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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up and said: “That’s what I meant to say.”  By then, he was nothing more
than a poor bowl of Jello just being whipped around from one side to the
other.
In another case one time, the Justices made a big issue of a video that
was included in the record of a case.  A fellow down in Georgia was speed-
ing in his car at high rates of speed—90 and100 miles per hour or some-
thing—at night, on a two-lane road, going through stop signs and stop
lights, hitting other cars, spinning around.  It was a real chase.  Justice
Scalia commented, he said: “That’s the biggest car chase I’ve seen since
The French Connection.”  The driver was injured when the police finally
tipped his car over to stop him to prevent him from taking any lives or
anything else.  Well the police saw it as a safety matter, but the injured
driver brought up a suit in court against the police.  He was trying to make
something out of his case—his attorney was—and he said: “Let me say this
about the chase.  My client always used his turn signal.”  Justice Kennedy
leaned over and said: “That’s like saying the strangler obeyed the no-smok-
ing sign.”  Tip to 3Ls—don’t try to make an axe murderer sound like
Mother Theresa.  It just won’t work.
After all those years I spent in the Army, I really did not know what to
expect at the Supreme Court.  I retired one night at midnight and went to
the Court the next day dressed in the new clothes that Jeanie made me buy
at Nordstrom’s.  I had no idea what I supposed to do but I was pleased to
find out that the work place there was just about as the Army was.  It is a
very structured environment.  It has really been an honor and a pleasure to
serve there for over 21 years.  I have enjoyed getting to know the Justices.
They are exceptionally bright and hard working.  They are also very down
to Earth and have a good sense of humor; easy to work for.  Only two that
are there now were there when I arrived: Justice Scalia and Justice Ken-
nedy.  So, I have worked for 16 justices on that Supreme Court.
One of the significant features about the Court is consistency.  Every-
thing we do is consistent.  We had the same Justices from 1994 to 2005;
that was 11 years with the same Justices.  Poor Justice Breyer was the jun-
ior Justice for all of that time.  That was the longest time that the same
Court had been together in 180 years.  In the last six years, we have had
four appointments; Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor
and Justice Kagan.  You might say, boy, I bet a lot of changes took place up
there.  But nothing really changed at all.  Maybe some things changed inter-
nally such as when they vote, but on the outside, and for the staff, it has
been the same Court, using the same rules, and same procedures; nothing
really changes.  A person like me having come from the military, I like that.
I don’t like sudden swift changes.  I like changes to be planned far in ad-
vance.
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Each year we receive about 8,000 petitions for certiorari.  We have a
process where every case is carefully examined, no matter if it is a two-
page, hand-written prisoner pro se case.  The petition is looked at carefully
and reviewed.  When the Justices meet and vote, four votes means that the
Court will grant the petition.  Next we set the case down for briefing and
argument.  With 8,000 petitions, we only grant about 75.  Unless your peti-
tion has a split in the circuits—same law but different result—or between
the state and a circuit, or unless it’s some new federal question that’s never
been answered, the Court, isn’t going to grant your case.  The Court is not
there to decide guilt and innocence, and do right in every case.  We just
cannot do it.  The grant rate is less than 1percent.  About 70 percent of our
petitions that come in are criminal and habeas corpus.  Only 30 percent are
civil cases.  Of those granted, the numbers are reversed.  About 70 percent
of the cases argued at the Court are civil cases, and the other 30 percent are
criminal cases and/or habeas corpus petitions.  Habeas corpus meaning: col-
lateral attack after a conviction in almost all cases.  All of the Justices sit-
ting today were judges before they got there, except for Justice Kagan.  She
was the former Solicitor General of the United States and the Dean of
Harvard Law School.  She had never argued cases in court until she became
the Solicitor General.  Her first year as Solicitor General, she argued six
cases and she did so very ably before she was nominated by President
Obama, confirmed, and came to the bench.  That is different from most
Justices.  As I said, all the others came from the federal circuits.  That is a
change.  Back in the period of the 1950s, only about a third of the Supreme
Court Justices had prior judicial experience.  Since that time, it has
changed, and about two-thirds of them have since that time [been judges
before joining the Court].  That is a matter of the President’s wishes on who
he wants to be on that Court.  The political process of going through the
confirmations of the nominee, I don’t think there’s any game plan, but a lot
of literature is written on it and it is all very interesting.  But I think each
President has to make up his or her mind and nominate whoever they want.
Prior judicial experience is not a requirement but most of them have had it.
So, by saying that, they know the business of judging.  I know some [Mon-
tana] Supreme Court Justices are here—it is a business—it is a legal busi-
ness and you got to know how to do it.  You just cannot reach out and take
a case because it is interesting.  They are all interesting—well, [maybe not]
some bankruptcy cases . . . .
But the President who appoints a Justice [and his political party] really
does not determine how that Justice is going to vote or anything else.  Each
Justice can have an ideology; we all have ideology, but it has nothing to do
with politics.  Unfortunately, we use political terms “conservative” and
“liberal” in politics, and then it slides over into the legal profession and we
4
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use it there.  I say it is unfortunate, but maybe they are the right terms to
use.  Some Justices are called conservatives and some are called liberal.
You have to be careful how the media labels a Justice in trying to determine
how they are going to vote.
Let me give you an example. Michigan vs. Bryant3 was decided just
last year.  Police were dispatched to a gas station where they found a mor-
tally wounded man.  He says, “I was shot by Bryant at Bryant’s home and I
drove myself here.”  Then he died.  The police went to Bryant’s home, and
they found incriminating evidence.  In a trial, the police testified as to what
Bryant told them before he died.  Forget the exception to the hearsay rule
that you think of right there, “Dying Declaration.”  The prosecution just did
not use it.  Instead, they relied on the old Supreme Court case, Ohio vs.
Roberts,4 which said that a statement [from an unavailable witness] is ad-
missible if it is reliable.  In other words, there is no cross examination,
right?  The witness is dead so you cannot cross-examine.  But the court let
the statement in, and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a
famous case called Crawford vs. Washington,5 the unanimous case, where
the wife told the police that her husband committed a certain crime.  When
it came time for the trial, she refused to testify, asserting the spousal immu-
nity privilege.  But the prosecution went ahead and convicted the husband
by using her prior statement, and the defendant Crawford said: “Look, I was
denied my Sixth Amendment right to cross examination.”  Supreme Court
said: “That’s right.  [The prosecution] is precluded [from using the prior
statement].”  The Sixth Amendment violation in Crawford left things un-
clear because the courts applied it only to testimonial statements.  So was
the man who died at the gas station, was it a testimonial statement or not?
In the Crawford case the Court said [the wife’s statement] was testimonial.
So back to the Bryant case, what happened?  We now have Crawford;
most people thought that the Crawford decision was going to mean that
Bryant had a right to cross examination, but the man is dead, so that’s not
allowable.  The Court held 6–2 that the statement is admissible because the
primary purpose was to enable police to conduct an ongoing investigation.
They said, therefore, it was not a testimonial statement and, therefore,
Crawford does not apply.  Again, the dying declaration exception was not
available because it was not raised at trial (note to potential prosecutors—
raise everything you can; get it in the record because once you get up on the
appellate level, if it’s not in the record you are not going to talk about it).
3. Mich. v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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You might say—as the press said: “That’s a pro-prosecution, very con-
servative result.”  The conviction was affirmed even though Crawford is the
law of the land.  Who wrote the opinion?  Justice Sotomayor.  The media
was saying: “Oh, no, she’s liberal.  She wouldn’t do something like that.”
Who dissented in favor of the defendant in the case?  Justice Scalia.  Of
course, he wrote Crawford.  He is supposed to be a conservative.  Why
would he [write a] liberal [opinion]—it is because those labels are easy to
apply but they do not stick.  After all, of the opinions we have every year,
the decisions—between 65 and 75 these days—40 percent are unanimous.
All nine agree.  I could not get the Law Review to agree to what we are
going to have for lunch.  Last term, I think we had 60 percent where the
cases were decided either 9–0 or 8–1.  It is rather remarkable.  Usually they
agree to agree or agree to disagree and then the opinion comes down.
The media has sort of labeled the Rehnquist Court and the Roberts
Court—if you can call them that—as conservative.  Let me just tick off a
list of results and, again, I am result oriented here like the media is some-
times.  Not the reason why the Court ruled that way, but these are some
results from the last 25 years or so that came out of the Supreme Court.
The Court upheld racial preferences in college admissions,6 struck down of
Texas law making homosexual conduct between consenting adults a crime,7
invalidated the all-male admission policy at the Virginia Military Institute,8
prohibited voluntary student prayer at public high school football games
down in Texas,9 prohibited imposing the death penalty for the mentally
retarded10 and for those who commit crimes under 18,11 and prohibited life
without parole for juveniles except in homicide cases.12  If you are using
the terms conservative and liberal, those don’t sound very conservative do
they?  I guess you would say, well, they sound more liberal.  How can the
Court be a conservative court if those kinds of rulings come down?  The
answer is—this is just Bill Suter speaking, by the way—I am not speaking
for the Court here, Dean, we all know that.  I don’t think the Court is con-
servative or it is really liberal.
Let’s look at a couple of areas of the law in recent years and let me tell
you what I think the trends are.  First, freedom of speech.  The Rehnquist
Court and the Roberts Court have been very active in protecting free
speech.  You might disagree on what free speech really is and I will not
6. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7. Lawrence v. Tex. ., 539 U.S. 538 (2003).
8. U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
10. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
11. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
12. Graham v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
6
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even talk about Citizens United—it is just too much to talk about, and one
of your professors is writing a very fine article on it.13
Free speech cases like Snyder vs. Phelps.14  This is the case where the
Westboro Baptist Church members protested at the funeral of a Marine who
had been killed in Iraq.  If you read all the media, you would think that the
protestors are right up in the face of the family.  They were not.  They were
1,000 feet away, and they were not making any noise.  The police approved
where they stood and what they did.  When the funeral cars came up to the
church, they stopped doing everything and they were making no noise.
They did not refer to this Marine, just to other soldiers who were killed.
The signs were very offensive.  They said things like: “The only good sol-
dier is a dead soldier.”  I find that particularly offensive, and I think you do
too.  The father of the Marine who was killed and buried never saw the
signs, but he saw them the next day on television.  He brought a lawsuit for
emotional distress and invasion of privacy.  He won a large judgment in the
district court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals down in Virginia re-
versed it.  It came to the Supreme Court, and it was very well argued.  An
emotional case, I might say.  You really can take sides pretty easily on this,
but you can’t let your heart overrule your mind when you are thinking about
it.  The court ruled 8–1 that the Fourth Circuit was affirmed.  I will quote to
you what the Chief Justice said in his majority opinion.  He said:
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both
joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. . . . [W]e cannot react
to that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a different
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do
not stifle public debate.  That choice requires that we shield [the church] from
tort liability for its picketing in this case.”15
The reaction to all of this was very emotional.  There were many spe-
cial interest groups on both sides said that said it was good, [others] said it
is bad, but whatever it is, that is the law.  Special interest groups that favor
free speech were particularly getting loud applause.  What is curious to me
is that some of those groups want to prohibit hate-crime speech.  Now the
difficulty there is what standard do you use when you say hate speech is a
crime.  What is your standard?  It might be offensive, it might be repugnant,
it might be very, very rude, but just saying something to another person you
might not want to associate with them but can you prohibit it?  I don’t
know.  A lot of colleges have tried with their speech codes.  My review of it
is most of them fail when they face a court.
13. See Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of
the Copper Kings, 72 Mont. L. Rev. 25 (2012).
14. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
15. Id. at 1220.
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Here is another free speech case that was argued recently, a very inter-
esting one, but much more difficult.  It involves the Stolen Valor Act of
2005.16  It has been a crime for many years to wear a military award or take
any benefit if you are not entitled to it.  It was never an offense to say: “I
have the Silver Star or the Bronze Star.”  Just to say it were words of free
speech.  I think you have a constitutional right to lie.  Right?  Under certain
circumstances there are limitations.  But Congress was tired and fed up with
all these people going around, especially those running for office, saying I
won this medal and I won that medal.  So they made it a crime to even say
it.  There was a crime, so what happened.  The crime for saying that you
have a Silver Star is a misdemeanor for six months.  If you say you have the
Medal of Honor, it enhances it to a year of confinement.  In Title 18, when
they passed the Stolen Valor Act, the writers of the legislation said that they
enhanced the punishment for anybody saying that they were awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor.  Mr. Alverez, our featured speaker here,
was running for office for the California Water District Board of Directors.
He falsely told the public that he was a retired Marine, that he had been
wounded in combat, and that he earned the Medal of Honor.  He actually
said the Congressional Medal of Honor.  He never served in the military
one day in his life.  By the way, he also said he played hockey for the
Detroit Red Wings.  That is not a crime.  He was convicted.  This came up
to the Supreme Court and has been argued.  The Ninth Circuit said that this
was an unconstitutional constraint on free speech.  That was pretty easy to
see and fairly predictable.  It has been argued and when it was argued at the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General Donald Verrilli made a very strong
argument in favor of the statute and also argued for showing deference to
Congress.  We don’t know how it is going to come out.17  One footnote
here is if we put all liars in prison there would be no bed space in prison.
We would have to build more prisons.  I just don’t know how it’s going to
come out.  Stay tuned and we’ll find out.
Freedom of Religion.  The Court has interpreted the Establishment
Clause pretty strictly.  I think that the Court has loosened up a little bit in
other areas such as support of church schools and so forth.  They did that a
few years ago when they upheld the school voucher case coming out of
Cleveland, Ohio.18  Just because some of the students might go to a paro-
chial school, the Court said, that that does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
16. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
17. The Court vacated Alvarez’s conviction and struck down the Stolen Valor Act by a vote of 6–3.
See id. at 2551.
18. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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This term we had sort of a blockbuster, which surprised a lot of peo-
ple: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC19—I will just call it Hosanna.  This was a woman who was teaching
at this church school and she was a “called” teacher as to opposed to just a
“lay” teacher.  She had been trained in religious studies and she conducted
some religious exercises.  She became ill and could not teach, so they hired
somebody else to start the school year.  In February, she came back and said
that she was ready to teach.  The superintendent of the school said, “No you
are not, you still have physical difficulties and you cannot teach.”  She ap-
parently made a disturbance and threatened to sue.  That violated Lutheran
policy and the church decided to terminate her employment.  She went to
the EEOC, and the EEOC agreed and filed suit.  The suit wound up at the
Supreme Court of the United States.  The thing here is, is there a ministerial
exception to the Americans with Disability Act?  That is a common law
restriction.  The circuit court said: “Yeah, there is a ministerial exception,
but she was not a minister.”  The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
last January, said she is a minister and these laws do not apply to church-
related activities.  Again, not a lot of reporting on that case, which I was
kind of surprised at, but it was a unanimous decision.  Again, labels; they
don’t work.
Criminal Law.  I think you have seen the end of the criminal law
revolution.  I’m not sure when it started but probably in the 1950s and
1960s.  Good or bad is not what I am here to say.  I think it is ending new
procedural criminal rights for defendants in cases.  The Rehnquist Court
and the Roberts Court have drawn more bright line rules to make criminal
law easier to understand by police and lower courts and to apply it effi-
ciently.
One case: Herring vs. United States.20  Herring was arrested because
there was an outstanding warrant listed for him.  He was stopped at a traffic
stop and the police checked out an outstanding warrant in a neighboring
county.  They arrest him.  So far, so good; all quite lawful.  They search,
and they found a gun and drugs.  Typical case?  Shortly thereafter that, what
did they find out?  Oops, the neighboring county called and said, “We
didn’t clean our database out.  That was taken care of a long time ago.”
There was no outstanding warrant.  So there was an illegal arrest and illegal
search.  It violated the Fourth Amendment.  The lower court said so.  But
they also said that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply because there was
no wrongdoing.  The Exclusionary Rule was created by the Supreme Court.
They felt like they had to do something about it.  The Fourth Amendment
19. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. Equal Empl. Opportunity Commn., 132 S. Ct.
694 (2011).
20. Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
9
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says searches must be reasonable.  But there is no remedy.  Almost a hun-
dred years ago, the Court said we need a remedy.  We just cannot have
police going and breaking down doors and going in, which was the Weeks
case,21 so we got the Exclusionary Rule.  Here, the courts said and it is an
exception to the Exclusionary Rule, if there was no wrongdoing by the po-
lice, you are not punishing the police and teaching them a lesson.  Some-
body did not make a data entry in a database and that is why he was ar-
rested.  There are some commentators that think that maybe it’s time to say,
“We don’t need the exclusionary rule anymore.”  I know that is shocking.
Some criminal law professors faint when I say something like that.  Police
are better trained; they have more sanctions for police.  You have Bivens22
suits that can go on if you do something that is truly illegal and unconstitu-
tional, but here it was a mistake.  What they did was, they found a criminal
and the Court said that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply in this case.  It
was 5–4 decision.  Not overwhelming.  Think about this: England and some
other civilized nations do not have the Exclusionary Rule.  They just don’t
have it.  They weigh the evidence in each case.  I am not here predicting
that we’re going to do away with Exclusionary Rule, but some people are
saying that, little by little, maybe we don’t need it anymore.
Second Amendment, Right to Bear Arms.  We have had two cases in
the last couple of years dealing with that.  The first one came out of the
District of Columbia.  The Court held that the Second Amendment does
guarantee the individual the right to bear arms not connected to the militia
cause.23  Case over.  That applied to only the District of Columbia.  A
couple years later we had another case, the McDonald case that came out of
Chicago.24  The question was, does that right apply to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, through the Incorporation Clause?  The Court said:
“Yes, it does.”  Another close case, but now we have the rule that you do
have the right to bear arms.  That opinion clearly said that there are certain
restrictions that you could put on this.  The state can restrict your right to
bear arms if you are a felon, if you are a juvenile, if you are mentally
unstable.  They have all these restrictions on bearing arms.  After all, are
there restrictions on free speech?  Sure: perjury, impersonating an officer,
lying on food products, etcetera.  There are a lot of restrictions on free
speech.  You can put restrictions on the right to bear arms.  What has hap-
pened is that a lot of jurisdictions are fighting this by imposing ordi-
nances—usually cities—making it more difficult for a person to bear a fire-
arm.  Again, not good or bad, but they are doing this.  That litigation on the
21. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1913) overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
24. McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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McDonald case in Chicago is still going on and on, trying to refine what the
Court meant by that case.  I saw one parallel to this that I thought was quite
interesting.  If the Supreme Court has said that you have the right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment, but somebody is trying to keep you
from exercising that right, are they similar to those back in the 1950s who
stood in the school-house door and wouldn’t let little children come in who
had their right to an education in school—an integrated school guaranteed
by Brown vs. Board of Education.25  I say that and you might be shocked,
but is there a difference?  If you had a constitutional right, are there differ-
ent elevations of rights under the Constitution?  I don’t know.  That is why
you are all lawyers and you are going to figure this out.
Right to Privacy.  Nope, the Court is not fooling around with the right
to privacy much anymore.  We had a case last year NASA vs. Nelson.26  The
federal government has always required, for 50 years, that employees fill
out forms about security and so forth; have you ever been arrested, have
you been convicted, etcetera.  After 9/11, they extended this to government
contract workers.  You work for somebody else, but the government has a
contract.  Some of these workers that were working for NASA objected to
this and said: “No, no, no, we have a constitutional right to informational
privacy.”  They kind of made that one up.  The said that we have this right
and we do not have to answer these questions.  Of course, they won their
case in the lower courts—the Ninth Circuit I might add—which said that
there is such a constitutional right of information privacy.  When it got to
the Supreme Court last year, the Court assumed that there is such a right.
Whenever a Court does that, look out because something else is going to
happen.  We will assume that there is such a right but it does not apply in
this case because these questions are entirely reasonable to ask if you have
been counseled for drug use and this and that.  We have to know who is
working for us in the jet propulsion lab for heaven’s sake.  That is where
these people worked.  Now, it was an 8–0 decision.  It was a unanimous
decision.  Justice Scalia was interesting, he concurred in the judgment.  He
said: “These background checks do not violate the Constitution.  There is
no such thing as a constitutional right of informational privacy, and we
should not assume such a thing.”  He was amazed that in the brief of these
NASA contract employees they talked about this right, but there was no
footnote citing any particular part of the Constitution where this came from.
He said, “I find this refreshingly honest.  If you are just going to make it up,
then don’t say it is in the Constitution, just call it a constitutional right.”  Of
course, the poor counsel that represented these people was asked that ques-
tion during oral argument, and he had to come up with an answer.  So what
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
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did he do?  When everything else fails, pull out the old due process clause.
He pulled out the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and said: “That’s
it.  That’s where I find it.”  You know what he could have said: “This right
is found in a penumbra emanating from a specific guarantee in the Bill of
Rights.”  Who said that? Griswold vs. Connecticut.27  It is there, and Gris-
wold is still good law.
The Court is now considering another affirmative action.  The most
significant affirmative action cases you thought were decided in 2003, the
Michigan University and Michigan Law School affirmative action cases,28
the question is using race as a factor and not the factor in school admis-
sions.  We have another case where the Court granted certiorari.  Watch out
for it on the docket, Fisher vs. Texas.29  It will be argued next term.  Down
in Texas, the law is, if you are in the top 10 percent of your high school
class, you are guaranteed a seat in a state college.  This woman, who hap-
pened to be white, missed the cut and she then said: “Look, I was not se-
lected at another school that I wanted to go to.”  What Texas has is a race-
neutral way of selecting students for the top 10 percent, but then they use
race as a factor for picking others.  She said that the state cannot have it
both ways.  It is going to be a very interesting case.  I expect it to come up
and be argued in October or November.
Of course, you are all waiting for me to say something about separa-
tion of powers.  Yep, March 26–28, we argued the Affordable Care Act
cases.  It has lots of other names on it but ACA are those cases dealing with
the National Health Care/Obamacare/PPACA testing the separation of pow-
ers.  It was really four separate arguments in three days.  They dealt with
the Anti-Injunction Act, the Mandate, the old Commerce Clause.  Remem-
ber Wickard v. Filburn30 dealt with what?  Wheat, growing wheat and eat-
ing it yourself.  The Commerce Clause covers that because it affects com-
merce.  The next big case in 1995, Lopez,31 the Gun Free Schools Zone Act
says that if you possess a gun within a 1,000 feet of a school, it is a federal
crime.  The Supreme Court struck down, not the whole act—they never
strike down a whole act, usually it is just one portion—and said: “What is
federal about that?  Where is the commerce?”  The gun did not cross state
lines.  That was a real sleeper.  Most people did not see that one coming.
The cases in the last few years it seems to be the Court is examining the
Commerce Clause more closely or we’re just getting more cases concerning
27. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
29. Fisher v. Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
30. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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the Commerce Clause—we’ve had a few others.  But that’s the biggest is-
sue in the Affordable Care Act cases.
Two others issues including severability and Medicaid.  One of the
interesting things here is that in all of these cases—in two of these cases,
both parties agreed that the lower court was wrong.  So what does the Su-
preme Court do in that instance?  The Court appoints an Amicus attorney to
argue the case in support of the lower court judgment to show a respect for
that court’s judgment, which I think is a really good idea.  The two counsel
who did that were handpicked by the Court.  They are not paid anything.
They do it, write the briefs, do the whole thing, and argue the case for
nothing because they are professionals.  They were asked to do a job, they
did it, and they did a very fine job of doing it.  That means when you are a
member of the bar of a court, you are not just a member, you are also an
officer of the court.  If you can do it and the court asked you to do some-
thing, I think, as a professional and officer, you should do it. I expect a
decision in the Affordable Care Act cases by the end of June.
Where does that put us?  A few trends, a little bit about the Court on
where we have been and where we are going.  The Court is not an institu-
tion that has an agenda where it says: “This term, here is what we are going
to do.  We are going to win the division and go to the finals and be the
NCAA champions.”  It just does not work that way.  We take whatever flies
in from the lower courts and that is what we have to work with.  I think it is
going to be more of the same. You see Affirmative Action, I thought it was
over with but it is back up again.  The Affordable Care Act cases might
spawn even more litigation.  We have no idea what is going on.  A lot of the
media predicted by listening to the arguments—we had pretty big crowds
those days, I might add—they predicted who is going to win.  That is a
pretty dangerous game.  In fact, your batting average is usually about 50
percent, you win some, and you lose some.  I have tried to predict every
case I have watched in 21 years.  When the arguments over, I circle on my
sheet who I think is going to win.  I am about 65 percent one year and 72
percent the next year.  I just cannot get any lower and cannot get any
higher.  Some are pretty obvious, but on others you just have no idea what
is really going to happen.  Hard to predict by oral argument, but oral argu-
ments are great fun and great education, and I recommend you come up and
watch one some time.
Thank you for your hospitality.
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